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Abstract. Appel and McAllester’s “step-indexed” logical relations have proven to be a
simple and effective technique for reasoning about programs in languages with semanti-
cally interesting types, such as general recursive types and general reference types. How-
ever, proofs using step-indexed models typically involve tedious, error-prone, and proof-
obscuring step-index arithmetic, so it is important to develop clean, high-level, equational
proof principles that avoid mention of step indices.
In this paper, we show how to reason about binary step-indexed logical relations in
an abstract and elegant way. Specifically, we define a logic LSLR, which is inspired by
Plotkin and Abadi’s logic for parametricity, but also supports recursively defined relations
by means of the modal “later” operator from Appel, Mellie`s, Richards, and Vouillon’s
“very modal model” paper. We encode in LSLR a logical relation for reasoning relationally
about programs in call-by-value System F extended with general recursive types. Using
this logical relation, we derive a set of useful rules with which we can prove contextual
equivalence and approximation results without counting steps.
1. Introduction
Appel and McAllester [6] invented the step-indexed model in order to express “semantic”
proofs of type safety for use in foundational proof-carrying code. The basic idea is to
characterize type inhabitation as a predicate indexed by the number of steps of computation
left before “the clock” runs out. If a term e belongs to a type τ for any number of steps
(i.e., for an arbitrarily wound-up clock), then it is truly semantically an inhabitant of τ .
The step-indexed characterization of type inhabitation has the benefit that it can be
defined inductively on the step index k. This is especially useful when modeling semantically
troublesome features like recursive and mutable reference types, whose inhabitants would be
otherwise difficult to define inductively on the type structure. Moreover, the step-indexed
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model’s reliance on very simple mathematical constructions makes it particularly convenient
for use in foundational type-theoretic proofs, in which all mathematical machinery must be
mechanized.
In subsequent work, Ahmed and coworkers have shown that the step-indexed model
can also be used for relational reasoning about programs in languages with semantically
interesting types, such as general recursive types and general reference types [4, 3, 5, 24].
However, a continual annoyance in working with step-indexed logical relations, as well
as a stumbling block to their general acceptance, is the tedious, error-prone, and proof-
obscuring reasoning about step indices that seems superficially to be an essential element
of the method. To give a firsthand example: the first two authors (together with Andreas
Rossberg) recently developed a step-indexed technique for proving representation indepen-
dence of “generative” ADTs, i.e., ADTs that employ, in an interdependent fashion, both
local state and existential type abstraction [5]. While the technique proved useful on a va-
riety of examples, we found that our proofs using it tended to be cluttered with step-index
arithmetic, to the point that their main substance was obscured. Thus, it seems clear that
widespread acceptance of step-indexed logical relations will hinge on the development of
abstract proof principles for reasoning about them.
The key difficulty in developing such abstract proof principles is that, in order to reason
about things being infinitely logically related, i.e., belonging to a step-indexed logical rela-
tion at all step levels—which is what one ultimately cares about—one must reason about
their presence in the logical relation at any particular step index, and this forces one into
finite, step-specific reasoning.
To see a concrete example of this, consider Ahmed’s step-indexed logical relation for
proving equivalence of programs written in an extension of System F with recursive types [4].
One might expect to have a step-free proof principle for establishing that two function values
are infinitely logically related, along the lines of: λx1.e1 and λx2.e2 are infinitely logically
related at the type σ → τ iff, whenever v1 and v2 are infinitely related at σ, it is the case
that e1[v1/x1] and e2[v2/x2] are infinitely related at τ . Instead, in Ahmed’s model we have
that λx1.e1 and λx2.e2 are infinitely related at σ → τ iff for all n ≥ 0, whenever v1 and v2
are related at σ for n steps, e1[v1/x1] and e2[v2/x2] are related at τ for n steps. That is, the
latter is a stronger property—if λx1.e1 and λx2.e2 map n-related arguments to n-related
results (for any n), then they also map infinitely-related arguments to infinitely-related
results, but the converse is not necessarily true. Thus, in proving infinite properties of the
step-indexed model, it seems necessary to reason about an arbitrary finite index n.
In this paper, we show how to alleviate this problem by reasoning inside a logic we call
LSLR. Our approach involves a novel synthesis of ideas from two well-known pieces of prior
work: (1) Plotkin and Abadi’s logic for relational reasoning about parametric polymorphism
(hereafter, PAL) [30], and (2) Appel, Mellie`s, Richards, and Vouillon’s “very modal model”
paper (hereafter, AMRV) [7].
PAL is a second-order intuitionistic logic extended with axioms for equational reasoning
about relational parametricity in pure System F. Plotkin and Abadi show how to define a
logical relation interpretation of System F types in terms of the basic constructs of their
logic. Second-order quantification over abstract relation variables is important in defining
the relational interpretation of polymorphic types.
In this paper, we adapt the basic apparatus of PAL toward a new purpose: reasoning
operationally about contextual equivalence and approximation in a call-by-value language
Fµ with recursive and polymorphic types. We will show how to encode in our logic LSLR a
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logical relation that is sound and complete with respect to contextual approximation, based
on a step-indexed relation previously published by Ahmed [4]. Compared with Ahmed’s
relation, ours is more abstract: proofs using it do not require any step-index arithmetic.
Furthermore, whereas Ahmed’s relation is fundamentally asymmetric, our logic enables the
derivation of both equational and inequational reasoning principles.
In order to adapt PAL in this way, we need in particular the ability to (1) reason
about call-by-value and (2) logically interpret recursive types of Fµ. To address (1), we
employ atomic predicates (and first-order axioms) related to CBV reduction instead of
PAL’s equational predicates and axioms. This approach is similar to earlier logics of partial
terms for call-by-value calculi with simple [28] and recursive (but not universal) types [2].
For handling recursive types, it suffices to have some way of defining recursive relations
µr.R in the logic. This can be done when R is suitably “contractive” in r; to express con-
tractiveness, we borrow the “later” ⊲P operator from AMRV, which they in turn borrowed
from Go¨del-Lo¨b logic [23]. Hence, LSLR is in fact not only a second-order logic (like PAL)
but a modal one, and the truth value of a proposition is the set of worlds (think: step levels)
at which it holds. The key reasoning principle concerning the later operator is the Lo¨b rule,
which states that (⊲P ⇒ P ) ⇒ P . This can be viewed as a principle of induction on step
levels, but we shall see that, when it is employed in connection with logical relations, it
also has a coinductive flavor reminiscent of the reasoning principles used in bisimulation
methods like Sumii and Pierce’s [34].
1.1. Overview. In Section 2, we present our language under consideration, Fµ.
In Section 3, we present our logic LSLR described above. We give a Kripke model of
LSLR with worlds being natural numbers, and “future worlds” being smaller numbers, so
that semantic truth values are downward-closed sets of natural numbers. We also present
a set of basic axioms that are sound with respect to this model, and which are useful in
deriving more complex rules later in the paper.
In Section 4, we define a logical relation interpretation of Fµ types directly in terms
of the syntactic relations of LSLR. Then we derive a set of useful rules for establishing
properties about the logical relation. Using these rules, it is easy to show that the logical
relation is sound and complete w.r.t. contextual approximation. We also show in this section
how to define a symmetric version of the logical relation, which enables direct equational
reasoning about Fµ programs.
In Section 5, we give examples of contextual equivalence proofs that employ purely
logical reasoning using the derivable rules from Section 4 (in particular, without any kind
of step-index arithmetic).
In Section 6, we demonstrate how our LSLR proofs improve on previous step-indexed
proofs by comparing our proof for one of the examples from Section 5 to a proof of that
example in the style of Ahmed [4].
In Section 7, we explain how the present version of LSLR improves on (and corrects a
technical flaw in) the version we published previously in LICS 2009 [14].
Finally, in Section 8, we discuss related work and conclude.
2. The Language Fµ
We consider Fµ, a call-by-value λ-calculus with impredicative polymorphism and iso-recur-
sive types. The syntax of Fµ is shown in Figure 1. Sum and recursive type injections are
4 D. DREYER, A. AHMED, AND L. BIRKEDAL
Types τ ::= α | unit | int | bool | τ1 × τ2 | τ1 + τ2 | τ1 → τ2 |
∀α. τ | ∃α. τ | µα. τ
Prim Ops o ::= + | − | = | < | ≤ | . . .
Terms e ::= x | 〈〉 | ±n | o(e1, . . . , en) |
true | false | if e then e1 else e2 |
〈e1, e2〉 | fst e | snd e |
inlτ e | inrτ e | case e of inlx1⇒e1 | inrx2⇒e2 |
λx : τ. e | e1 e2 | Λα. e | e τ |
pack τ, e as∃α. τ ′ | unpack e1 asα, x in e2 |
rollτ e | unrolle
Values v ::= x | 〈〉 | ±n | true | false | 〈v1, v2〉 | inlτ v | inrτ v |
λx : τ. e | Λα. e | pack τ1, v as∃α. τ | rollτ v
Figure 1: Fµ Syntax
Eval. Contexts E ::= [·] | o(v1, . . . , vi−1, E, ei+1, . . . , en) |
ifE then e1 else e2 | 〈E, e2〉 | 〈v1, E〉 | fstE | sndE |
inlτ E | inrτ E | caseE of inlx1⇒e1 | inrx2⇒e2 |
E e | v E | E τ | pack τ1, E as∃α. τ | unpackE asα, x in e2 |
rollτ E | unrollE
e❀ e′
if truethen e1 else e2 ❀ e1
if falsethen e1 else e2 ❀ e2
fst 〈v1, v2〉 ❀ v1
snd 〈v1, v2〉 ❀ v2
case (inlτ v) of inlx1⇒e1 | inrx2⇒e2 ❀ e1[v/x1]
case (inrτ v) of inlx1⇒e1 | inrx2⇒e2 ❀ e2[v/x2]
(λx : τ. e) v ❀ e[v/x]
(Λα. e) τ ❀ e[τ/α]
unpack (pack τ, v as∃α. τ1) asα, x in e ❀ e[v/x][τ/α]
unroll (rollτ v) ❀ v
e ❀ e′
E[e] ❀ E[e′]
Figure 2: Fµ Dynamic Semantics
type-annotated to ensure unique typing, but we will often omit the annotations when they
are obvious from context. Figure 2 shows the left-to-right call-by-value dynamic semantics
for the language, defined as a small-step relation on terms (written e❀ e′), which employs
evaluation contexts E in the standard way. Note that the reduction relation is deterministic.
Fµ typing judgments have the form Γ ⊢ e : τ , where the context Γ binds type variables
α, as well as term variables x: Γ ::= · | Γ, α | Γ, x : τ . The typing rules are also standard
and are given in full in Appendix A (Figure 10).
2.1. Contextual Approximation and Equivalence. A context C is a term with a single
hole [·] in it. The typing judgment for contexts has the form ⊢ C : (Γ ⊢ τ)  (Γ′ ⊢ τ ′),
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Relation Variables r ∈ RelVar
Fµ Variable Contexts X ::= · | X , α | X , x
Fµ Variable Substitutions γ ::= · | γ, α 7→ τ | γ, x 7→ e
Relation Contexts R ::= · | R, r
Relation Substitutions ϕ ::= · | ϕ, r 7→ R
Proposition Contexts P ::= · | P , P
Combined Contexts C ::= X ;R;P
Atomic Relations A,B ::= e1 = e2 | · · ·
Relations P,Q,R, S ::= r | A | ⊤ | ⊥ | P ∧Q | P ∨Q | P ⇒ Q |
∀X .P | ∃X .P | ∀R.P | ∃R.P |
x.P | e ∈ R | µr.R | ⊲P
Figure 3: Syntax of Core LSLR
where (Γ ⊢ τ) indicates the type of the hole. This judgment essentially says that if e is a
term such that Γ ⊢ e : τ , then Γ′ ⊢ C[e] : τ ′. Its formal definition appears in Appendix A
(Figures 11 and 12).
We define contextual approximation (Γ ⊢ e1
ctx e2 : τ) to mean that, for any well-typed
program context C with a hole of the type of e1 and e2, the termination of C[e1] (written
C[e1] ⇓) implies the termination of C[e2]. Contextual equivalence (Γ ⊢ e1 ≈
ctx e2 : τ) is
then defined as approximation in both directions.
Definition 2.1 (Contextual Approximation & Equivalence). Let Γ ⊢ e1 : τ and Γ ⊢ e2 : τ .
Γ ⊢ e1 
ctx e2 : τ
def
= ∀C, τ ′. (⊢ C : (Γ ⊢ τ) (· ⊢ τ ′) ∧ C[e1] ⇓) ⇒ C[e2] ⇓
Γ ⊢ e1 ≈
ctx e2 : τ
def
= Γ ⊢ e1 
ctx e2 : τ ∧ Γ ⊢ e2 
ctx e1 : τ
3. The Logic LSLR
LSLR is a second-order intuitionistic modal logic supporting a primitive notion of term
relations, as well as the ability to define such relations recursively.
3.1. Syntax. The core syntax of LSLR is given in Figure 3.
Fµ variable contexts X are similar to Fµ contexts Γ, except that they omit type anno-
tations on term variables. Instead, well-typedness of variables is modeled through explicit
typing hypotheses in the proposition context P (see below). Fµ variable substitutions γ
map variables bound in Fµ variable contexts to objects of the appropriate syntactic class.
As a matter of notation, we will use y and t as term variables in addition to x. Often,
we write x or y to denote values, whereas t stands for arbitrary terms. (This is merely a
mnemonic, however. The fact that x or y is a value will always be guaranteed by some
separate, explicit assumption.)
Relation contexts R bind relation variables r, which stand for relations of arbitrary
arity between Fµ terms. For ease of notation, we assume that relation variables r come
equipped implicitly with a particular arity (namely, arity(r)). Relation substitutions ϕ
map relation variables to relations R of the appropriate arity, which we describe below.
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Proposition contexts P are sets of propositions, which are just nullary relations that we
typically denote using P and Q. (Note: We treat all three kinds of contexts as unordered
sets, and use comma to denote disjoint union of such sets.)
We write C to denote a combined context X ;R;P. Correspondingly, we also define
C,X ′ to mean X ,X ′;R;P (and similarly for C,R′ and C,P ′).
Relations R (of which propositions P are a subset) fall into several categories: variable
relations (r), atomic relations (A), first-order propositions (⊤, ⊥, P ∧Q, P ∨Q, P ⇒ Q,
∀X .P , ∃X .P ), second-order propositions (∀R.P , ∃R.P ), relation introduction and elimina-
tion (x.P , e ∈ R), recursive relations (µr.R), and the later modality (⊲P ) borrowed from
AMRV [7].
Atomic propositions A and the axioms concerning them are essentially orthogonal to
the other components of the logic. We have listed in Figure 3 one particularly central atomic
proposition, e1 = e2, which says that e1 and e2 are syntactically equal modulo renaming of
bound variables. In Section 4.2, we will introduce several other atomic propositions related
to the reduction semantics of Fµ. The only common requirement we impose on all of these
atomic propositions is that they are first-order, in the sense that they only depend on type
and term variables, not relation variables.
The first-order connectives are self-explanatory. The second-order ones provide the
ability to abstract over a relation, which is critical in defining logical relations for polymor-
phic and existential types. As for the relational introduction and elimination forms: x.P ,
which we sometimes write as (x).P , introduces the term relation that one would write in
set notation as {(x) | P}, and e ∈ R says that the tuple of terms (e) belong to the relation
R. In general, we use the overbar notation to denote a possibly nullary tuple of objects.
A recursive relation µr.R denotes the relation R that may refer to itself recursively
via the variable r. In order to ensure that such relations are well-founded, we require
that R be contractive in r, a notion that we make precise (following AMRV) using the
modal ⊲ operator. Specifically, we define R to be contractive in r if r may only appear in
R underneath the ⊲ operator (i.e., inside propositions of the form ⊲P ). Intuitively (and
formally), ⊲P means that P is true in all strictly future worlds of the current one. As a
result, the meaning of µr.R only depends recursively on its own meaning in strictly future
worlds. Thus, assuming that the “strictly future world” ordering is well-founded, we can
define the meaning of µr.R by induction on strictly future worlds.
3.2. A “Step-Indexed” Model of LSLR. Figure 4 defines a Kripke model for LSLR,
where the worlds are natural numbers and m is a strictly future world of n if m < n. The
model enjoys monotonicity, meaning that if a proposition is true in world n, it is true in all
strictly future worlds as well. Thus, the set of semantic truth values is the complete Heyting
algebra P↓(N) of downward-closed subsets of N, ordered by inclusion (or, isomorphically,
the complete Heyting algebra ~ω of vertical natural numbers with infinity).
We interpret relations and proposition contexts under some semantic interpretation
δ, which maps their free relation variables to semantic (i.e., world-indexed, monotone)
relations of the appropriate arity. We write JRKδne (resp. JPKδn) to mean that, under
interpretation δ, e ∈ R (resp. P) is true in world n. The interpretations refer to JX K and
JRK. The semantic interpretation of a variable context, JX K, is the set of closing variable
substitutions γ whose domains equal X . The semantic interpretation of a relation context,
JRK, is the set of semantic relation substitutions δ whose domains equal R.
LOGICAL STEP-INDEXED LOGICAL RELATIONS ∗ 7
If n = 0, then:
JRKδne
def
= ⊤
JPKδn
def
= ⊤
If n > 0, then:
JrKδne
def
= δrne
JAKδne
def
= I(A)e
J⊤Kδn
def
= ⊤
J⊥Kδn
def
= ⊥
JP ∧QKδn
def
= JP Kδn ∧ JQKδn
JP ∨QKδn
def
= JP Kδn ∨ JQKδn
JP ⇒ QKδn
def
= ∀k ≤ n. JP Kδk ⇒ JQKδk
J∀X .P Kδn
def
= ∀γ ∈ JX K . JγP Kδn
J∃X .P Kδn
def
= ∃γ ∈ JX K . JγP Kδn
J∀R.P Kδn
def
= ∀δ′ ∈ JRK . JP K(δ, δ′)n
J∃R.P Kδn
def
= ∃δ′ ∈ JRK . JP K(δ, δ′)n
Jx.P Kδne
def
= JP [e/x]Kδn
Je ∈ RKδn
def
= JRKδne
Jµr.RKδne
def
= JR[µr.R/r]Kδne
J⊲P Kδn
def
= JP Kδ(n− 1)
JPKδn
def
= ∀P ∈ P . JP Kδn
Figure 4: Kripke “Step-Indexed” Model of LSLR
The interpretations in Figure 4 are defined by a double induction, first on the world n
(in world 0, everything is true), and second on the “size” of the relation being interpreted.
The size of a relation is defined to equal the number of logical/relational connectives in it,
ignoring all connectives appearing inside a proposition of the form ⊲P (i.e., ⊲P has constant
size, no matter what P is). This size metric makes it possible to interpret a recursive relation
µr.R directly in terms of its expansion R[µr.R/r]. Assuming the relation is well-formed, this
interpretation is well-defined because the expansion has a smaller size. (Specifically, since
R is contractive in r, we know that r may only appear inside constant-size propositions in
R, so the size of R[µr.R/r] equals the size of R, which is smaller than the size of µr.R.)
Since ⊲P may have smaller size than P , it is critical that the interpretation of ⊲P in
world n be defined in terms of the interpretation of P in strictly future worlds (i.e., worlds
strictly less than n). Fortunately, this is no problem since, as explained above, ⊲P means
precisely that P is true in all strictly future worlds. Thanks to the built-in monotonicity
restriction, it suffices to say that ⊲P is true in world n iff P is true in world n− 1.
Otherwise, the interpretation is mostly standard. One point of note is the interpretation
of implication P ⇒ Q, which quantifies over all future worlds in order to ensure monotonic-
ity. Another is the interpretation of atomic relations A. We assume an interpretation
function I, which maps closed atomic relations A to absolute (i.e., world-independent)
relations. As one instance, we define I(e1 = e2) to be true (⊤) iff e1 is α-equivalent to e2.
Using this model, we can define our main logical judgment, X ;R;P ⊢ P . Assuming that
P and P are well-formed in X ;R (see Appendix B for the definition of proposition/relation
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C ⊢ P
C ⊢ ⊲P
(mono)
C, ⊲P ⊢ P
C ⊢ P
(lo¨b)
C ⊢ ⊲(P ∧Q)
C ⊢ ⊲P ∧ ⊲Q
(⊲∧)
C ⊢ ⊲(P ∨Q)
C ⊢ ⊲P ∨ ⊲Q
(⊲∨)
C ⊢ ⊲(P ⇒ Q)
C ⊢ ⊲P ⇒ ⊲Q
(⊲⇒)
C ⊢ ⊲∀X .P
C ⊢ ∀X .⊲P
(⊲∀1)
C ⊢ ⊲∃X .P
C ⊢ ∃X .⊲P
(⊲∃1)
C ⊢ ⊲∀R.P
C ⊢ ∀R.⊲P
(⊲∀2)
C ⊢ ⊲∃R.P
C ⊢ ∃R.⊲P
(⊲∃2)
C ⊢ e1 = e2 C ⊢ P [e1/x]
C ⊢ P [e2/x]
(replace1)
C ⊢ R1 ≡ R2 C ⊢ P [R1/r]
C ⊢ P [R2/r]
(replace2)
C ⊢ e ∈ x.P
C ⊢ P [e/x]
(elem)
C ⊢ e ∈ µr.R
C ⊢ e ∈ R[µr.R/r]
(elem-µ)
Figure 5: Core Inference Rules of LSLR
well-formedness), the judgment is interpreted as follows:
X ;R;P ⊢ P
def
= ∀n ≥ 0. ∀γ ∈ JX K . ∀δ ∈ JRK . JγPKδn ⇒ JγP Kδn
Note that we interpret the judgment directly as a statement in the model, rather than
inductively defining it via a set of inference rules. This allows us to prove new inference
rules sound whenever needed. In the next section, however, we will establish a core set
of sound inference rules that will enable us to reason about the judgment (in most cases)
without having to appeal directly to the model.
The judgment asserts that under any closing substitution γ for X and any semantic
interpretation δ for R, and in any world n, the hypotheses P imply the conclusion P . The
key here is that, while n is universally quantified and thus not explicitly mentioned in the
logical judgment, the hypotheses P and the conclusion P are both interpreted in the same
world (i.e., step level) n. This is what allows us to prove something like “f1 and f2 map
n-related arguments to n-related results” (as discussed in the introduction) without having
to talk about a specific step level n.
Finally, it is worth noting that, while the Kripke model we have defined here may be
viewed as a “step-indexed” model, nothing in the model mentions steps of computation. We
happen to be using natural numbers as our worlds, but there is no computational meaning
attached to them at this point. The connection between worlds and (certain) steps of
computation will be made later on, when we define the logical relation for Fµ in Section 4.
3.3. Core Inference Rules. We now present the core inference rules of LSLR, all of
which are easy to prove sound directly in the model. The most interesting ones are shown
in Figure 5; the remainder, all of which are standard rules for second-order intuitionistic
logic, appear in Appendix B.
Rule mono is the axiom of monotonicity, stating that propositions that are true now
(in the current world) are also true later (in future worlds). The lo¨b rule, adapted from
AMRV, provides a clean induction principle over future worlds. If under the assumption
that A is true later (in all strictly future worlds) we can prove that it is true in the current
world, then by induction A is true in the current world. The induction argument requires
no base case because all propositions are assumed true in the final world (i.e., world 0).
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The remainder of the rules concerning the later operator state that the later operator
distributes over all propositional connectives. Not all these distributivity laws are valid in
classical Go¨del-Lo¨b logic or AMRV, but they hold here due to our axiom of monotonicity.
For example, we give here the proof of Rule ⊲⇒:
Proposition 3.1. Rule ⊲⇒ is admissible.
Proof. First, the forwards direction. Suppose J⊲(P ⇒ Q)Kδn and J⊲P Kδn. We want to show
J⊲QKδn. If n = 0, the proof is trivial, so assume n > 0. By the interpretation of ⊲, we know
JP ⇒ QKδ(n− 1) and JP Kδ(n − 1). Thus, by the interpretation of⇒, we know JQKδ(n − 1),
which is equivalent to our goal.
Next, the backwards direction. Suppose J⊲P ⇒ ⊲QKδn; we want to show J⊲(P ⇒ Q)Kδn.
If n = 0, the proof is trivial, so assume n > 0. Our goal is equivalent to JP ⇒ QKδ(n − 1),
so suppose k ≤ n − 1 and JP Kδk, and we will prove JQKδk. By the interpretation of ⊲, we
know J⊲P Kδ(k + 1). Since k + 1 ≤ n, by the interpretation of ⇒ we obtain J⊲QKδ(k + 1),
which is equivalent to JQKδk, our desired goal.
Note that the backwards direction relies critically on monotonicity. In the absence of
monotonicity, the premise J⊲P ⇒ ⊲QKδn is only applicable if JP Kδk for all k < n, but in
the proof we only assume JP Kδk for some k < n.
The replacement axioms (replace1 and replace2) say that we can substitute equals
for equals inside a proposition without affecting its meaning. For terms, equality is just
syntactic equality. For relations, equivalence is definable as
R1 ≡ R2
def
= ∀x. (x ∈ R1 ⇒ x ∈ R2) ∧ (x ∈ R2 ⇒ x ∈ R1)
The last two rules concern inhabitation of relations. The key interesting point here is
that recursive relations are equivalent to their expansions.
Lastly, when we introduce atomic propositions in the next section related to Fµ re-
duction, we will want to also import into LSLR various first-order theorems about those
propositions, e.g., preservation, progress, canonical forms, etc. Fortunately, this can be
done easily, without requiring any stepwise reasoning.
Formally, assuming P is a first-order proposition (i.e., it does not involve relation
variables, recursive relations, second-order quantification, or the ⊲ operator), then it is easy
to show that P is true in all worlds n iff it is true in world 1 (the “latest” nontrivial world).
Consequently, the following rule is sound:
∀γ ∈ JX K . ∀δ ∈ JRK . JγPK δ(1)⇒ JγP K δ(1)
X ;R;P ⊢ P
Thus, in particular, if P is closed:
JP K 1
⊢ P
For first-order P , the interpretation of JP K 1 in our model is tantamount to the standard
step-free interpretation of P in first-order logic.
In other words, our goal here is not to use LSLR to formalize entire proofs, just the
parts of the proofs that involve interesting relational reasoning. We are happy to make use
of first-order syntactic properties proved by other means in the meta-logic.
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4. A Syntactic Logical Relation for Fµ
In this section, we show how to define a logical relation for Fµ that coincides with contex-
tual approximation, as well as a symmetric version thereof that coincides with contextual
equivalence. The relation is defined syntactically within the logic LSLR, using a particular
set of atomic propositions concerning the Fµ reduction semantics, as we explain below.
4.1. Roadmap and Preliminaries. Eventually, we are going to define a logical relation
on open terms, which we denote Γ ⊢ e1 
log e2 : τ , and prove that it is sound and complete
w.r.t. contextual approximation, Γ ⊢ e1 
ctx e2 : τ , as defined in Section 2. In order to
prove this, we will follow Pitts [26] in employing an intermediate form of approximation,
often referred to as ciu approximation.
Ciu approximation, due to Mason and Talcott [21], is a superficially coarser version
of contextual approximation in which (1) attention is restricted to evaluation contexts E
instead of arbitrary program contexts, and (2) the “closing” of open terms is handled by an
explicit substitution γ instead of relying on λ-abstractions in a closing context C. We say
that ciu approximation is only superficially coarser because ultimately we will prove that
it too coincides with contextual approximation. In the meantime, ciu approximation turns
out to be an easier notion of approximation to work with.
First, a bit of notation: we will write ⊢ γ : Γ to mean that (1) dom(γ) = dom(Γ), (2)
∀α ∈ Γ. FV(γα) = ∅, and (3) ∀x : τ ∈ Γ. ∃v. γx = v ∧ ⊢ v : γτ . We will also write
⊢ E : τ  τ ′ to mean ⊢ E : (· ⊢ τ)  (· ⊢ τ ′), thus defining the typing of evaluation
contexts in terms of the typing judgment for general contexts C (introduced in Section 2.1).
Definition 4.1 (Ciu Approximation for Closed Terms). Let · ⊢ e1 : τ and · ⊢ e2 : τ .
⊢ e1 
ciu e2 : τ
def
= ∀E, τ ′. (⊢ E : τ  τ ′ ∧E[e1] ⇓) ⇒ E[e2] ⇓
Definition 4.2 (Ciu Approximation for Open Terms). Let Γ ⊢ e1 : τ and Γ ⊢ e2 : τ .
Γ ⊢ e1 
ciu e2 : τ
def
= ∀γ. ⊢ γ : Γ ⇒ ⊢ γe1 
ciu γe2 : γτ
Definition 4.3 (Ciu Equivalence). Let Γ ⊢ e1 : τ and Γ ⊢ e2 : τ .
Γ ⊢ e1 ≈
ciu e2 : τ
def
= Γ ⊢ e1 
ciu e2 : τ ∧ Γ ⊢ e2 
ciu e1 : τ
One of the main reasons to use ciu approximation instead of contextual approximation is
that it is immediately obvious that the Fµ reduction relation is contained in ciu equivalence
(part (3) of the following proposition).
Proposition 4.4 (Useful Properties of Ciu Approximation).
(1) If Γ ⊢ e : τ , then Γ ⊢ e ciu e : τ .
(2) If Γ ⊢ e1 
ciu e2 : τ and Γ ⊢ e2 
ciu e3 : τ , then Γ ⊢ e1 
ciu e3 : τ .
(3) If Γ ⊢ e1 : τ and e1 ❀
∗ e2, then Γ ⊢ e1 ≈
ciu e2 : τ .
(4) If ⊢ e1 
ciu e2 : τ and ⊢ E : τ  τ
′, then ⊢ E[e1] 
ciu E[e2] : τ
′.
Again following Pitts [26], we will show that contextual, ciu, and logical approximation all
coincide by showing that ctx ⊆ ciu ⊆ log ⊆ ctx . The first link of that chain is easy.
Theorem 4.5 (Contextual Approximation ⇒ Ciu Approximation).
If Γ ⊢ e1 
ctx e2 : τ , then Γ ⊢ e1 
ciu e2 : τ
LOGICAL STEP-INDEXED LOGICAL RELATIONS ∗ 11
Proof. Suppose ⊢ γ : Γ, ⊢ E : γτ  τ ′, and E[γe1] ⇓. We want to show E[γe2] ⇓. Say that
Γ = α1, . . . , αm, x1 : τ1, . . . , xn : τn and that γαi = σi and γxi = vi for some σi’s and vi’s.
Then, let C = (Λα1. · · ·Λαm.λx1 : τ1. · · ·λxn : τn. [·])σ1 · · · σmv1 · · · vn. It is easy to show
that ⊢ C : (Γ ⊢ τ) (· ⊢ γτ), and thus that ⊢ E[C] : (Γ ⊢ τ)  (· ⊢ τ ′). It is also easy to
show that E[C[ei]]❀
∗ E[γei], and thus that E[C[ei]] ⇓ iff E[γei] ⇓. So the goal is reduced
to showing that E[C[e1]] ⇓ implies E[C[e2]] ⇓, which follows from Γ ⊢ e1 
ctx e2 : τ .
4.2. Atomic Relations. In order to define our logical relation, we introduce the following
new atomic relations:
A ::= · · · | Val | e : τ | C : τ  τ ′ | e1 ❀
∗ e2 | e1 ❀
0 e2 | e1 ❀
1 e2 | e1  e2
Except for the first, which is a unary relation, the rest are all nullary (i.e., propositions).
The interpretations of these propositions, I(A), are as follows:
• I(Val)(e)
def
= ∃v. e = v.
• I(e : τ)
def
= ⊢ e : τ .
• I(C : τ  τ ′)
def
= ∃E. C = E ∧ ⊢ E : τ  τ ′.
• I(e1 ❀
∗ e2)
def
= e1 ❀
∗ e2.
• I(e1 ❀
0 e2)
def
= e1 ❀
∗ e2 and none of the reductions in the reduction sequence is an
unroll-roll reduction.
• I(e1 ❀
1 e2)
def
= e1 ❀
∗ e2 and exactly one of the reductions in the reduction sequence is
an unroll-roll reduction.
• I(e1  e2)
def
= ∃τ. ⊢ e1 
ciu e2 : τ .
The motivation for using this particular set of atomic propositions will become clear
shortly. One point of note is that the e1  e2 proposition lacks a type; this is simply for
brevity, since Fµ enjoys unique typing. Another is that, although the proposition C : τ  τ ′
permits an arbitrary context C, the proposition only holds when C takes the form of an
evaluation context, and we will only use it when C is an evaluation context. The reason
that we do not syntactically write E here instead of C is simply that the syntaxes of
values v and evaluation contexts E are not closed under substitution of arbitrary terms for
variables—they assume that variables are values—and we want proposition well-formedness
to be preserved under arbitrary term substitutions. All this means, practically speaking,
is that something like x [·] : τ  τ ′ cannot hold categorically, but only in a context where
x ∈ Val is also provable.
As explained in Section 3.3, along with these new atomic propositions, we will also
make use of various first-order theorems about them, which are provable straightforwardly
in the meta-logic without requiring any stepwise reasoning. For example,
C ⊢ e❀1 e1 C ⊢ e❀
1 e2
C ⊢ e1 ❀
0 e2 ∨ e2 ❀
0 e1
and
C ⊢ E : τ  τ ′ C ⊢ e1 : τ C ⊢ e2 : τ C ⊢ e1  e2
C ⊢ E[e1]  E[e2]
See the proofs in subsequent sections for more examples.
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V JαK ρ
def
= R, where ρ(α) = (τ1, τ2, R)
V JτbK ρ
def
= (x1 ↓ τb, x2 ↓ τb). x1 = x2, where τb ∈ {unit, int, bool}
V Jτ ′ × τ ′′K ρ
def
= (x1 ↓ ρ1(τ ′ × τ ′′), x2 ↓ ρ2(τ ′ × τ ′′)).
∃x′1, x
′′
1 , x
′
2, x
′′
2 . x1 = 〈x
′
1, x
′′
1 〉 ∧ x2 = 〈x
′
2, x
′′
2 〉 ∧
(x′1, x
′
2) ∈ V Jτ
′K ρ ∧ (x′′1 , x
′′
2 ) ∈ V Jτ
′′K ρ
V Jτ ′ + τ ′′K ρ
def
= (x1 ↓ ρ1(τ ′ + τ ′′), x2 ↓ ρ2(τ ′ + τ ′′)).
(∃x′1, x
′
2. x1 = inlx
′
1 ∧ x2 = inlx
′
2 ∧ (x
′
1, x
′
2) ∈ V Jτ
′K ρ) ∨
(∃x′′1 , x
′′
2 . x1 = inrx
′′
1 ∧ x2 = inrx
′′
2 ∧ (x
′′
1 , x
′′
2 ) ∈ V Jτ
′′K ρ))
V Jτ ′ → τ ′′K ρ
def
= (x1 ↓ ρ1(τ ′ → τ ′′), x2 ↓ ρ2(τ ′ → τ ′′)).
∀y1, y2. (y1, y2) ∈ V Jτ ′K ρ⇒ (x1y1, x2y2) ∈ E Jτ ′′K ρ
V J∀α. τK ρ
def
= (x1 ↓ ρ1(∀α. τ), x2 ↓ ρ2(∀α. τ)).
∀α1, α2. ∀r. r : VRel(α1, α2)⇒ (x1 α1, x2 α2) ∈ E JτK ρ, α 7→ (α1, α2, r)
V J∃α. τK ρ
def
= (x1 ↓ ρ1(∃α. τ), x2 ↓ ρ2(∃α. τ)).
∃α1, α2, y1, y2. ∃r. r : VRel(α1, α2) ∧
x1 = packα1, y1 as∃α. ρ1τ ∧ x2 = packα2, y2 as∃α. ρ2τ ∧
(y1, y2) ∈ V JτK ρ, α 7→ (α1, α2, r)
V Jµα. τK ρ
def
= µr.(x1 ↓ ρ1(µα. τ), x2 ↓ ρ2(µα. τ)).
∃y1, y2. x1 = roll y1 ∧ x2 = roll y2 ∧
⊲(y1, y2) ∈ V JτK ρ, α 7→ (ρ1(µα. τ), ρ2(µα. τ), r)
E JτK ρ
def
= µr.(t1 : ρ1τ, t2 : ρ2τ).
(∀x1. t1 ⇓0 x1 ⇒ ∃x2. x2  t2 ∧ (x1, x2) ∈ V JτK ρ) ∧
(∀t′1. t1 ❀
1 t′1 ⇒ ⊲(t
′
1, t2) ∈ r)
Figure 6: Syntactic Logical Relation for Fµ
Finally, we will make use of some additional notation, which is definable in terms of
the atomic propositions we have introduced:
e ↓ τ
def
= e : τ ∧ e ∈ Val
e1 ⇓ e2
def
= e1 ❀
∗ e2 ∧ e2 ∈ Val
e1 ⇓
0 e2
def
= e1 ❀
0 e2 ∧ e2 ∈ Val
R : TRel(τ1, τ2)
def
= ∀x1, x2. (x1, x2) ∈ R ⇒ x1 : τ1 ∧ x2 : τ2
R : VRel(τ1, τ2)
def
= ∀x1, x2. (x1, x2) ∈ R ⇒ x1 ↓ τ1 ∧ x2 ↓ τ2
(x1 : τ1, x2 : τ2). P
def
= (x1, x2). x1 : τ1 ∧ x2 : τ2 ∧ P
(x1 ↓ τ1, x2 ↓ τ2). P
def
= (x1, x2). x1 ↓ τ1 ∧ x2 ↓ τ2 ∧ P
4.3. Logical Relation. Figure 6 defines two logical relations for Fµ, one for values (V JτK ρ)
and one for terms (E JτK ρ). These are syntactic LSLR relations, defined by induction on τ .
Here, ρ is assumed to be a syntactic relational interpretation of the free type variables of
τ , i.e., a mapping from each α ∈ FV(τ) to a triple (τ1, τ2, R) such that R : VRel(τ1, τ2).
We write ρi to mean the type substitution mapping each α to the corresponding τi. Thus,
it is trivial to prove that V JτK ρ : VRel(ρ1τ, ρ2τ) and E JτK ρ : TRel(ρ1τ, ρ2τ). Except for
the last two cases (V Jµα.τK ρ and E JτK ρ), the definition of the logical relation is entirely
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straightforward, following Plotkin and Abadi [30], with each type constructor being modeled
by its corresponding logical connective via the Curry-Howard isomorphism.
First, let us consider V Jµα.τ K ρ. The basic idea here is to give the relational interpreta-
tion of a recursive type using a recursive relation µr.R. Recall, though, that references to r
in R must only appear under “later” propositions. Thus, we have that roll v1 and roll v2
are related by V Jµα.τK ρ “now” iff v1 and v2 are related by V JτK ρ, α 7→ (. . . ,V Jµα.τ K ρ) =
V Jτ [µα.τ/α]K ρ “later”.
Next, consider E JτK ρ. Intuitively, we would like to say that two terms e1 and e2 are
related if, whenever e1 evaluates to some value v1, we have that e2 also evaluates to some
value v2 such that (v1, v2) ∈ V JτK ρ. In fact, in the case that e1 evaluates to v1 without
incurring any unroll-roll reductions (i.e., when e1 ⇓
0 v1), the definition of E JτK ρ almost
says this—the only difference is that instead of saying “e2 evaluates to some value v2 such
that. . . ”, it says that “e2 is ciu-approximated by some value v2 such that. . . ” Of course,
by definition of ciu approximation, this also implies that e2 terminates, but it is somewhat
more liberal in that it does not require the value that e2 produces to be directly related to
v1 by V JτK ρ. This extra freedom is not strictly necessary if we just want to define a logical
relation that is sound w.r.t. contextual approximation—as we did in the previous version
of this paper [14]—but it is key to ensuring completeness (see Theorems 4.24 and 4.25
in Section 4.6). An alternative approach to ensuring completeness would be to employ
⊤⊤-closure, as Pitts does [26]. We discuss this alternative in Section 8.
However, in the case that the evaluation of e1 incurs an unroll-roll reduction, the
interpretation of recursive types forces us to require something still weaker. Specifically, in
order to prove that the logical relation is sound with respect to contextual approximation, we
must prove that it is compatible in the sense of Pitts [26]. Compatibility for unroll demands
that if roll v1 and roll v2 are logically related, then unroll (roll v1) and unroll (roll v2)
are related, too. By definition of V Jµα.τK ρ, knowing roll v1 and roll v2 are related
only tells us that v1 and v2 are related “later”. We need to be able to derive from that
that unroll (roll v1) and unroll (roll v2) are related “now”. Thus, in defining whether
(e1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ, in the case that e1 makes an unroll-roll reduction (i.e., e1 ❀
1 e′1), we
only require that e′1 and e2 be related later (i.e., ⊲(e
′
1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ).
For the reader who is familiar with prior work on step-indexed models and logical
relations, our formulation here may seem familiar and yet somewhat unusual. Our use of
the later operator corresponds to where one would “go down a step” in the construction
of a step-indexed model. However, in prior work, step-indexed models typically go down a
step everywhere (i.e., in every case of the logical relation), not just in one or two places, and
“count” every step, not just unroll-roll reductions. If one is working with equi-recursive
types, this may be the only option, but here we are working with iso-recursive types, and
our present formulation serves to isolate the use of the later operator to the few places
where it is absolutely needed. While we do not believe there is a fundamental difference
between what one can prove using this logical relation vs. previous accounts, our formulation
enables more felicitous statements of certain properties, such as the extensionality principle
for functions (see discussion of Rule funext below).
Finally, it is worth noting that, like step-indexed models, LSLR imposes no “admissibil-
ity” requirement on candidate relations. Intuitively, the reason admissibility is unnecessary
is that it is an infinitary property. In LSLR, we only ever reason about finitary properties,
i.e., propositions that hold true in the “current” world; we do not even have the ability
(within the logic) to talk about truth in all worlds.
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C ⊢ (e1, e2) ∈ V JτK ρ
C ⊢ (e1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ
(val) ⊳ C ⊢ P
C ⊢ ⊲P
(weak-⊲)
C ⊢ e1 : ρ1τ
C ⊢ e1 ❀∗ e′1 C ⊢ (e
′
1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ
C ⊢ (e1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ
(exp)
C ⊢ e1 : ρ1τ C ⊢ e2 : ρ2τ
C ⊢ e1 ❀1 e′1 C ⊢ ⊲(e
′
1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ
C ⊢ (e1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ
(exp-⊲)
C ⊢ e′1 ❀
0 e1 C ⊢ (e′1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ
C ⊢ (e1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ
(red)
C ⊢ (e1, e′2) ∈ E JτK ρ C ⊢ e
′
2  e2
C ⊢ (e1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ
(ciu)
C ⊢ E : ρ1τ  ρ′1τ
′ C ⊢ f : ρ′2τ
′ C ⊢ (e1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ
C, x1, x2, (x1, x2) ∈ V JτK ρ, e1 ❀∗ x1, x2  e2 ⊢ (E[x1], f) ∈ E Jτ ′K ρ′
C ⊢ (E[e1], f) ∈ E Jτ ′K ρ′
(bind)
C ⊢ E1 : ρ1τ  ρ
′
1τ
′ C ⊢ E2 : ρ2τ  ρ
′
2τ
′ C ⊢ (e1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ
C, x1, x2, (x1, x2) ∈ V JτK ρ, e1 ❀∗ x1, x2  e2 ⊢ (E1[x1], E2[x2]) ∈ E Jτ ′K ρ′
C ⊢ (E1[e1], E2[e2]) ∈ E Jτ ′K ρ′
(bind2)
C ⊢ (f1, f2) ∈ E Jτ ′ → τ ′′K ρ C ⊢ (e1, e2) ∈ E Jτ ′K ρ
C ⊢ (f1 e1, f2 e2) ∈ E Jτ ′′K ρ
(app)
C ⊢ (e1, e2) ∈ E Jµα. τK ρ
C ⊢ (unroll e1, unrolle2) ∈ E Jτ [µα. τ/α]K ρ
(unroll)
C ⊢ e1 ↓ ρ1(τ ′ → τ ′′) C ⊢ e2 ↓ ρ2(τ ′ → τ ′′)
C, x1, x2, (x1, x2) ∈ V Jτ ′K ρ ⊢ (e1x1, e2x2) ∈ E Jτ ′′K ρ
C ⊢ (e1, e2) ∈ V Jτ
′ → τ ′′K ρ
(funext)
Fi = fix f(xi). ei C ⊢ F1 : ρ1(τ ′ → τ ′′) C ⊢ F2 : ρ2(τ ′ → τ ′′)
⊳ C, x1, x2, (x1, x2) ∈ V Jτ ′K ρ, (F1, F2) ∈ V Jτ ′ → τ ′′K ρ ⊢ (e1[F1/f ], e2[F2/f ]) ∈ E Jτ ′′K ρ
C ⊢ (F1, F2) ∈ V Jτ ′ → τ ′′K ρ
(fix)
Figure 7: Some Useful Derivable Rules
4.4. Derivable Rules. Figure 7 shows a number of useful inference rules that are derivable
in the logic. To be clear, by “derivable” we mean that the proofs of these rules’ soundness
(given below in Section 4.5) is done just using the inference rules we have established so
far, without needing to appeal directly to the model and perform stepwise reasoning. In
all these rules, we assume implicitly that all propositions are well-formed. For the rules
concerning V JτK ρ and E JτK ρ, we assume that ρ binds the free variables of τ and maps
them to triples (τ1, τ2, R), where R : VRel(τ1, τ2) is provable in the ambient context.
Rule val says that E JτK ρ contains V JτK ρ. This rule is so fundamental and ubiquitously
useful that we will often elide mention of it in our proofs.
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Rule weak-⊲ is a weakening property that is easy to derive from the distributivity
laws for the ⊲ operator. The rule employs an ⊳ operator (pronounced “earlier”) on propo-
sitions/contexts, defined as follows:
⊳ (X ;R;P )
def
= X ;R; ⊳ P
⊳ (⊲P )
def
= P
⊳P
def
= P (if P 6= ⊲P ′)
This ⊳ operator has the effect of “un-⊲-ing” (i.e., stripping the ⊲ off of) any ⊲P hypotheses
in the context. Note that this is purely a shallow syntactic operation; it does not un-⊲
any hypotheses that are propositionally equivalent to some ⊲P but not syntactically of that
form. (The reader may wonder why we define ⊳ in this syntactic way instead of building it
in as a primitive modality with the seemingly natural interpretation J⊳P Kδn = JP Kδ(n + 1).
The trouble is that this interpretation is not well-founded, since it defines the meaning of
⊳P in terms of the meaning of P at a higher step level. And indeed, our syntactic ⊳ does
not satisfy this interpretation.)
Consequently, Rule weak-⊲ says that if we want to show P is true later, given some
assumptions that are true now, and others that are true later, then we can just prove that
P is true now given that all the assumptions are true now. This is a weakening property
because, applying the rule backwards, we forget the fact that some of the hypotheses in C
(namely, those that are not of the form ⊲P ) are true at an earlier world than the others.
The weak-⊲ rule is particularly useful in conjunction with the lo¨b rule. Specifically,
thanks to the lo¨b rule, a frequently effective approach to proving two terms e1 and e2 related
is to assume inductively that they are related later and then prove that they are related
now. Eventually, we may reduce our proof goal (via, e.g., Rule exp-⊲, explained below) to
showing that two other terms e′1 and e
′
2 are related later. At that point, Rule weak-⊲ allows
us to un-⊲ both our new proof goal (relatedness of e′1 and e
′
2) and our original lo¨b-inductive
hypothesis (relatedness of e1 and e2) simultaneously. We will see an instance of this proof
pattern in the example in Section 5.2.
The next four rules in Figure 7 allow one to prove that two terms e1 and e2 are related
by converting one of the terms to something else. Rule exp (closure of the logical relation
under expansion) allows one to reduce e1 to some e
′
1 according to the ❀
∗ relation and then
show that e′1 is related to e2. Rule red (closure of the logical relation under❀
0 reduction)
allows one to expand e1 to some e
′
1 according to the ❀
0 relation and then show that e′1 is
related to e2. Rule ciu allows one to replace e2 with some e
′
2 that ciu-approximates it, and
then show that e1 is related to e
′
2. Rule exp-⊲ is similar to Rule exp, but addresses the
case when e1 incurs an unroll-roll reduction on the way to e
′
1. In this case, unfolding the
definition of E JτK ρ, all we have to show is that e′1 and e2 are related later.
The aforementioned rules are all useful when we know what the terms in question
reduce/expand to. Rule bind is important because it handles the case when a term is
“stuck”. For instance, suppose we want to show that e and f are related, where e is of the
form E[e1] (i.e., e1 is in evaluation position in e, and E is the evaluation context surrounding
it). Perhaps e1 is something like y1(v1), in which case there is no way to reduce it. However,
if we can prove that y1(v1) is logically related to some other expression e2, then there are
two cases to consider. In the case that they both terminate, we can assume that there are
some values x1 and x2 such that e1 evaluates to x1, e2 is ciu-approximated by x2, and x1
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and x2 are related by V JτK ρ, and the goal is reduced to showing that E[x1] is related to f .
In the case that e1 diverges, there is nothing to show, since E[e1] will diverge, too.
The bind rule may seem at first glance a bit peculiar in that the term e2 does not
necessarily have any relationship to f , and the variable x2 does not appear anywhere on
the r.h.s. of the last premise. This peculiarity is a consequence of the rule being as general
as possible. In the specific (if common) case that f is in fact of the form E2[e2] (i.e., that
e2 is in evaluation position in f), an easy corollary of Rules bind and ciu is Rule bind2.
In addition to being more intuitive, this more symmetric-looking variant of the bind rule is
very useful in deriving compatibility properties [26], such as Rules app and unroll; these
compatibility properties are necessary in order to establish that the logical relation is a
precongruence (and hence contained in contextual approximation), and Rule bind2 helps
to reduce the derivations of these properties to the case where the e’s and f ’s are values.
Rule bind2 does not subsume Rule bind, however: the general and distinctly asymmetric
nature of the original Rule bind renders it suitable for reasoning about logical approximation
in cases where the more symmetric Rule bind2 does not apply—for instance, see the proof
of the “free theorem” example in Section 5.3.
Rule funext demonstrates a clean extensionality property for function values, which
was one of our key motivations for LSLR in the first place. (The property does not hold for
arbitrary terms in our call-by-value semantics.) It is worth noting that, in prior step-indexed
models, this extensionality property is not quite so clean to state. For example, if one were
to encode Ahmed’s relation [4] in our logic directly, the assumption (x1, x2) ∈ V Jτ
′K ρ would
have to be ⊲’d. The key to our cleaner formulation is simply that we confine the use of ⊲ in
V JτK ρ to the case when τ is a recursive type. Thus, in particular, one need not mention ⊲
when reasoning purely about functions and β-reduction.
Finally, Rule fix gives the rule for recursive functions, which are encodable in a well-
known way in terms of recursive types. We formalize the encoding as follows:
fix f(x). e
def
= λy.(unroll v) v y
where v = roll (λz.(λf.λx.e)(λy.(unroll z) z y))
for y, z 6∈ FV(e)
This encoding has the property that if F = fix f(x). e, then F (v) ❀1 e[F/f, v/x]. Con-
sequently, to show two recursive functions related, we may lo¨b-inductively assume they
are related while proving that their bodies are related. (For the proof that the bodies are
related, we may also un-⊲ any other ⊲ hypotheses in the ambient context C.) The implicit
use of lo¨b induction in this rule gives it a distinctively coinductive flavor.
4.5. Proofs of Derivability. In this section, we show how to derive the rules in Figure 7.
Proposition 4.6 (Type Substitution).
(1) V Jτ [σ/α]Kρ = V JτKρ, α 7→ (ρ1σ, ρ2σ,V JσKρ).
(2) E Jτ [σ/α]Kρ = E JτKρ, α 7→ (ρ1σ, ρ2σ,V JσKρ).
Proof. By straightforward induction on the structure of τ .
Proposition 4.7. Rule val is derivable.
Proof. Immediate, since  is reflexive.
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Proposition 4.8. Rule weak-⊲ is derivable.
Proof. Suppose C = X ;R;P. Then, ⊳ C ⊢ P implies X ;R; · ⊢ (
∧
Q∈P ⊳Q) ⇒ P . By
Rule mono and the distributivity axioms, X ;R; · ⊢ (
∧
Q∈P ⊲⊳Q) ⇒ ⊲P . Since Q ⇒ ⊲⊳Q,
we have X ;R; · ⊢ (
∧
Q∈P Q)⇒ ⊲P , and thus C ⊢ ⊲P .
Proposition 4.9. Rule red is derivable.
Proof. First, suppose that e1 ⇓
0 x1 for some value x1. Then, e
′
1 ❀
0 e1 implies that e
′
1 ⇓
0 x1
as well, and the rest follows immediately from (e′1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ.
Second, suppose that e1 ❀
1 t1 for some term t1. Then, e
′
1 ❀
0 e1 implies that e
′
1 ❀
1 t1
as well, so again the rest follows immediately from (e′1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ.
Proposition 4.10. Rule exp is derivable given the additional premise that C ⊢ e1 ❀
0 e′1.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Rule red. The key bits are: (1) if e1 ⇓
0 x1
and e1 ❀
0 e′1, then e
′
1 ⇓
0 x1 by determinacy of reduction, and (2) if e1 ❀
1 t1 and e1 ❀
0 e′1,
then e′1 ❀
1 t1, again by determinacy of reduction.
Proposition 4.11. Rule exp-⊲ is derivable.
Proof. First, suppose that e1 ⇓
0 x1 for some value x1. Then, e1 ❀
1 e′1 yields a contradiction.
Second, suppose that e1 ❀
1 t1 for some term t1. Then, since e1 ❀
1 e′1, we have by
determinacy of reduction that either e′1 ❀
0 t1 or t1 ❀
0 e′1. Thus, by either Proposition 4.9
or 4.10, ⊲(e′1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ implies ⊲(t1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ, which is what we needed to show.
Proposition 4.12. Rule exp is derivable.
Proof. Assume the premises of Rule exp. We will prove the following proposition and then
instantiate t1 with e1 to obtain the desired result.
∀t1. (t1 : ρ1τ ∧ t1 ❀
∗ e′1)⇒ (t1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ
The proof is by lo¨b induction, i.e., we use the lo¨b rule to assume the above proposition
is true “later” (under a ⊲ modality) and then prove it true “now”. So assume t1 : ρ1τ and
t1 ❀
∗ e′1, and we want to prove (t1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ. It is thus either the case that t1 ❀
0 e′1
or that there exists t′1 such that t1 ❀
1 t′1 ❀
∗ e′1. In the former case, the result follows
by Proposition 4.10 and the assumption (e′1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ. In the latter case we have, by
the lo¨b-inductive hypothesis (i.e., the ⊲-ed version of our original goal) together with the
distributivity of ⊲ over ∀ and ⇒, that ⊲(t′1 : ρ1τ ∧ t
′
1 ❀
∗ e′1) ⇒ ⊲(t
′
1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ. We
already know that t′1 ❀
∗ e′1, and t
′
1 : ρ1τ follows by type preservation, so by Rule mono,
we have that ⊲(t′1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ. The result then follows from t1 ❀
1 t′1 and Rule exp-⊲.
Proposition 4.13. Rule ciu is derivable.
Proof. As for Rule exp, the proof here is by lo¨b induction. Given the premises of Rule ciu,
we prove the following and then instantiate t1 to e1:
∀t1. (t1, e
′
2) ∈ E JτK ρ⇒ (t1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ
Assume this is true later, and we proceed to prove it now. So assume (t1, e
′
2) ∈ E JτK ρ, and
we want to prove (t1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ.
First, suppose t1 ⇓
0 x1. Then, there exists x2 such that (x1, x2) ∈ V JτK ρ and x2  e
′
2.
Since by assumption e′2  e2 and  is transitive, we have that x2  e2, so we are done.
Second, suppose t1 ❀
1 t′1. Then, ⊲(t
′
1, e
′
2) ∈ E JτK ρ, so by the lo¨b-inductive hypothesis,
⊲(t′1, e2) ∈ E JτK ρ.
